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I. INTRODUCTION
Like public government, and for some of the same reasons,
corporate governance is in crisis. Both seem unable to persuasively
articulate their fundamental values; both have been losing legitimacy
and credibility; both have been destabilized by rapid and complex
socio-technical change; and both are finding it more difficult to
accommodate the conflicting claims of internal constituencies and
those of relevant "others."
However, workers are assigned very different roles in public
government and corporate governance. Workers, like everyone else, are
entitled to participate in the rites of public government. They may vote,
run for office, and contribute to public debates either personally or as
part of a collectivity of like-minded individuals. Moreover, workers can
reasonably expect to have their voices heard and their rights respected.
To be sure, they fare less well at the hands of the state than they ought
to in theory. Their interests are compromised by technocratic control of
the policy process, by bureaucratic indifference, by the influence of
corporate campaign contributions on government policy, by the clamour
of competing claims, and by their own false consciousness. However,
one rough measure of the democratic character of any state remains the
extent to which workers are accommodated de jure and de facto within
the processes and institutions of public government.
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This is not the case in the context of corporate governance.' The
presumption is that workers will not participate in the making of
important decisions, including many which directly and dramatically affect
their interests. This presumption may be rebutted under compulsion of
law or by dint of economic pressure. It may be modified if corporate
management deems it expedient to allow workers a larger role. However,
the original presumption against participation remains the default
position, and derogation from it is limited. Nor is departure from
democratic principle viewed as problematic. Corporations, we assume,
are market actors, not sites of political debate; they exist to make money,
not to provide workers with opportunities for civic engagement.
However, public government and corporate governance are not
so easily assigned to separate domains. Governments charter
corporations, specify their governance structures, regulate the sale of
their shares, require financial reporting, and prevent dishonest dealing.
They create conditions which enable corporations to participate in
markets by building infrastructure, educating the workforce, enforcing
bargains, protecting property,. ensuring honesty, and maintaining order.
And, however reluctantly, they regulate the relationship between
workers and their corporate employers. They specify minimum
conditions of employment, protect (or at least acknowledge) the
practices of collective bargaining and tax, and regulate corporations to
ensure that the workers are somewhat buffered against the
consequences of labour market fluctuations, accident, illness,
discrimination, and old age.
Seen in this light, state intervention to ensure workers a formal
role in the structures of corporate governance would not seem to
represent a radical departure. Indeed, given the contemporary crisis of
corporate governance, which has had such dire consequences for so
many workers, -it might even be regarded as a timely departure. After
all, changes associated with technological developments, flexibilization,
neo-liberalism, and globalization have altered the corporate structures
and contractual arrangements governing work, as well. as the content
and character of work, the demography of the workforce, the regulatory
environment, and the managerial cultures of corporations. Taken
together, these changes have shifted the balance of power even more
For an insightful treatment of the dichotomy between labour and corporate policy, law,
and scholarship, see Peer Zumbansen, "The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor
Law" (2006) 13 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 261.
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definitively in favour of employers and against unions and workers.
Nonetheless, the assumption that owners, directors, and managers do-
and should-exercise virtually unilateral control over corporate decision
making is as unlikely to be revisited now as at any time since
corporations first came to dominate the economic landscape. It is buried
too deeply in our labour, corporation, contract, tort, and criminal law; it
is embedded too firmly in the social relations and cultural practices of
corporate workplaces; it is justified too conclusively by ideology,
economic science, and occasionally religion; it is a paradigmatic
assumption about corporate governance so fundamental as to be almost
beyond retrieval and, consequently, beyond reconsideration.
In the next section of this article, we describe four post-war
attempts to re-imagine the role of workers within the corporation and
their relation to the processes of corporate governance. Each has some
descriptive power; each has some normative appeal; but each ultimately
failed. Nonetheless, we believe that these four narratives provide
important insights into the political economy of the corporation, which we
develop at greater length in the third section of this essay. To anticipate
our conclusions, they reveal the corporation not only as it is usually
imagined-as a site of orderly governance, rational decision making and
purposeful coordination-but also as a site of conflict. Conflict is too
seldom acknowledged in discussions of corporate governance, and when
acknowledged, it is dismissed as pathological. But as the post-war
experience of corporation-worker relations seems to demonstrate, conflict
appears to be endemic to the political economy of corporations.
While acknowledging the dangers of extrapolation from this
unique domain of corporate decision making, we suggest that these
insights may help to explain and predict how the political economy of
corporations-not their governance structure-determines the fate of
workers as of the shareholders, debt-holders and creditors, corporate
managers and professional advisors, participants in corporate supply
and distribution chains, consumers of corporate goods and services, and
inhabitants of communities and environments which come within the
corporate force field.
If our suggestion is sound, future attempts to re-imagine and
reform the corporation should begin, not with attempts to modify
existing institutions of governance, but with attempts to better
comprehend its own political economy. To that end, we will conclude
with a series of hypotheses which we hope will stimulate further debate
and research.
[VOL. 45, NO. 3
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II. EMPLOYEE INTERESTS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
In this section we explore four attempts during the post-war
period to influence corporate decision making by reconceptualizing the
status and rights of employees within corporations.
A. Employees as "Citizens at Work"
Collective bargaining makes certain implicit assumptions about
corporate governance: that the interests of employers and employees
are in tension; that this tension should be and can be resolved by
negotiations between the two sides; that corporate managers will seek to
maximize their interests by striking the most advantageous bargain; and
that such bargains are evaluated and confirmed through the structures
of corporate governance. Or to look at the matter the other way around,
wages and working conditions will be determined unilaterally by
corporate decision makers-except to the extent that unions are able to
influence such determinations through persuasion or power. In this
sense, unions under collective bargaining acquire influence within the
corporate decision making process comparable to that of the
corporation's competitors, its most valued customers, or regulatory
agencies. They are a force to be reckoned with, to be avoided if possible,
and to be accommodated if not.
Moreover, an extensive literature reminds us that even without a
formal system of collective bargaining, workplace normativity is shaped,
to a significant extent, by "the web of rule" which is spun through
ongoing interactions among workers and managers.2 Cooperation
between and among them must be translated into well-understood and
well-accepted routines and rituals to avoid constant renegotiation. Even
where they appear to be acting unilaterally, supervisors must
accommodate some worker preferences to maintain morale and
productivity; and in knowledge-intensive industries especially, where
workers must take many decisions on their own, routines and rituals
often give way to explicit delegations of responsibility exercised through
self-regulating teams.3 Thus collective bargaining does not initiate but
2 J.T. Dunlop, The Industrial Relations System (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1958) at 7-18.
1 P.K. Edwards & Hugh Scullion, "Deviancy Theory and Industrial Praxis: A Study of
Discipline and Social Control in an Industrial Setting" (1982) 16 Sociology 322; Stuart Henry, Private
2007]
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rather extends, makes explicit, and formalizes the involvement of
workers in operational decisions in the corporate workplace, though
seldom in the boardroom.
Formality is at its most extreme in North America, where
collective bargaining from the 1930s onwards has been increasingly
juridified. The legal right to organize and to bargain collectively was
established by statute and enforced by an administrative agency.4
Workplace disputes were adjudicated by arbitrators operating under a
statutory mandate;5 the rules of industrial conflict were defined by
common law and legislation;6 and judicial enforcement of rights and
review of administrative and arbitral proceedings became
commonplace.7 Even the internal affairs of trade unions came under
statutory regulation, especially in the United States.8 Individual
employment relations were treated similarly, though to a lesser degree.
While the parties retain their contractual freedom to define the terms of
the employment bargain, legislation has circumscribed its exercise to an
extent. Minimum labour standards were introduced in the United States
in the 1930s; 9 employers and workers were obliged to contribute to a
social security fund;1" and employers were required to provide safe and
healthy working conditions and forbidden to engage in discrimination
and harassment at work."1  All of these statutorily compelled
arrangements were to be enforced through judicial or administrative
Justice: Towards Integrated Theorizing in the Sociology of Law(London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1983);
and Otto Kahn-Freund, "Intergroup Conflicts and their Settlement" (1954) 5 Brit. J. of Soc'y 193.
4 National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1994)) [NLRA].
'Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, s.57.
6 G.W. Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2d ed. (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1993 looseleaf);
Julius G. Getman et al., Labor Management Relations and the Law, 2d ed. (New York, Foundation
Press, 1999), c. 4.
1 David A. Wright, "'Foreign to the Competence of Courts' Versus 'One Law for All':
Labour Arbitrators' Powers and Judicial Review in the United States and Canada" (2002) 23
Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 967.
' The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 411, 501
provides legal protections for democratic practice and financial accountability within labour unions.
9 Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 109-157 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 201-219 (2005).
'
0 SocialSecurity Act, 49 Stat. 648 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 301-1397j).
" The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.A. 651-678; Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Pub. L. 88-352) (codified as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)) [Title
VII]; Racial Discrimination Act 1944, S.O. 1944, c. 51; and Canada Fair Employment Practices Act,
S.C. 1952-53, c.19. See Paul H. Norgren & Samuel E. Hill, Toward Fair Employment (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1964) for the early history of state fair employment laws.
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proceedings," though recent decisions of the Supreme Court have
allowed these proceedings to be displaced by private arbitration.'3
These statutory regimes were rightly regarded by corporate
employers as state-imposed limitations on their capacity to manage their
workforces through unilateral managerial decisions-especially in the
United States, in which the default presumption of "employment-at-
will" survives not only as an operative legal concept,14 but as a baseline
condition of the new psychological contract between workers and
employers. 5 How could all these intrusions on corporate decision
making be justified? In a country in which constitutional doctrine often
acts as a proxy for political discourse, it is not surprising that the
justification was expressed as an extended constitutional metaphor.
Workers, it was argued, should be entitled to rights in the
workplace analogous to those enjoyed by them as citizens in a pluralist
democracy. Thus, collective bargaining legislation came to be portrayed
as the vindication of "freedom of association." The right of the majority
of workers in an enterprise to vote to democratically "elect" a union as
their collective bargaining agent and the right of employers to exercise
their "freedom of speech" to solicit votes in opposition are both
sheltered under obvious constitutional analogies. Collective agreements
detailing wage scales, access to promotion, and other incidents of
employment heralded the advent of "the rule of law" in the workplace,
while just cause for discharge and arbitration provisions ensured "due
process" for workers.
12 The Occupational Health and SafetyAct of 1970, ibid.; Title VII, ibid.
'3 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, "Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s" (1996) 73 Denv. U.L. Rev. 1017; Clyde W. Summers,
"Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate" (2004) 6
U. Pa. J. Lab. & Employment L. 685.-
' See e.g. Sanford M. Jacoby, "The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the
United States and England: An Historical Analysis" (1982) 5 Comp. Lab. L.J. 84; Clyde W.
Summers, "Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers" (2000) 3 U.
Pa. J. of Lab. & Employment L. 65.
s Pauline T. Kim, "Norms, Learning and the Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers'
Legal Knowledge" (1999) U. Ill. L. Rev. 447, empirically demonstrates that employees believe-
wrongly-that they have just cause recourse in law. Katherine V.. Stone, From Widgets to Digits.
Employment Regulation for the Changing Workplace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)
at 48-50, argues that the effect of the "at will" doctrine was to an extent masked by the growth of
internal labour markets which offered many workers de facto security in employment, even in the
absence of legal protections. This security evaporated, she argues, when the digital economy destroyed
these internal markets. See also Denise M. Rousseau, & Snehal A. Tijoriwala, "Assessing
Psychological Contracts: Issues, Alternatives and Measures" (1998) 19 J. Organiz. Behav. 679.
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Explicit constitutional allusions were less common elsewhere,
though some states did entrench labour and social rights. However,
collective bargaining, labour standards, and anti-discrimination and
social security legislations came to be regarded as a grundnorm, a
fundamental premise, of the post-war social contract.1 6 Even when
workers in those countries did not literally acquire rights of "industrial
citizenship, ' ' 17 what emerged in the post-war settlement was indeed a
new constitutional order-metaphorical rather than juridical-that
decreed an end to unilateral managerial rule. But like so many other
constitutional orders, this one proved easier to proclaim than to apply to
the daily reality of life in the workplace.
Collective bargaining achieved some notable successes. Workers
in unionized enterprises generally enjoyed better wages and working
conditions, greater job security, and a more equitable regimen than their
counterparts in enterprises without unions.18 But in the United States,
union membership levelled off at about one-third of the non-
government workforce in the 1960s, and then in subsequent decades
subsided to under ten per cent.1 9 In Canada, it had reached almost forty
per cent in the 1970s and now hovers around thirty per cent, about the
average for OECD countries.2 ° In part, this reflects the failure of
unions-especially American unions-to reach out to new
constituencies of workers. Other factors include the inherent constraints
of highly juridified systems, the inability of collective bargaining to
address the complex crises of a globalizing economy, and the dissolution
of labour-dominated political coalitions."1
16 Milton Derber, The American Idea of Industrial Democracy, 1865-1965 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1970); Katherine Stone, "The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor
Law" (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 1509 at 1514-15.
17 Harry W. Arthurs, "Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Task for Canada's Second
Century" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 786.
1" Richard B. Freeman, & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (New York: Basic
Books, 1984); Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment
Law(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
9 United States: Labor Research Association. "Union Trends and Data: Union Statistics,"
"(2000), online: <http://www.workinglife.org> (formerly <http://www.laborresearch.org >).
20 Clara Chang & Constance Sorrentino, "Union Membership Statistics in 12 Countries"
(1991) 114 Monthly Lab. Rev. 46 at 48; Jelle Visser, "Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries"
(2006) 129 Monthly Lab. Rev. 38.
21 Cynthia Estlund, "Ossification of American Labor Law" (2002) 102 Col. L.R. 1527. See
also Symposium on the Future of Private Sector Unionism in the United States ( 2001) in 22(2) and
22(3) J. of Lab. Res. (227-688).
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Mostly, however, collective bargaining in the United States did
not so much expire of natural causes, as perish as a result of injuries
suffered through aggravated assault by management. Since the 1970s,
corporate America has waged wars of attrition to forestall unionization,
litigating endlessly to avoid complying with labour laws, blocking
legislative attempts to enhance workers rights, neutering labour tribunals,
and introducing Human Resources (HR) policies to reduce worker
discontent.22 And while collective bargaining suffered its greatest setbacks
in the United States, it is also under siege pretty much everywhere else.
American attitudes and strategies have been easily exported to branch
plant economies, such as Canada.23 Other countries-the United
Kingdom under the Thatcher government, Australia, and New Zealand-
launched their own ideological crusades against unions, often aided and
abetted by elements of the corporate community." Even in European
countries, where collective bargaining has not been subjected to frontal
attack, where "citizenship" rights remain relatively entrenched, and where
corporate leaders apparently remain committed to social market values,
collective bargaining systems and labour market policies are being revised
in response to real or perceived competition from the United States and,
especially, from developing countries.'
In short, even allowing for considerable variation among the
advanced economies, collective bargaining-the assertion of citizenship
rights by workers-seems unlikely to contribute much to the current
wave of corporate governance reforms.
B. Employees as "Stakeholders"
Some recent literature acknowledges, at least implicitly, the
failure of collective bargaining to endow employees with the rights of
22 Freeman & Medoff, supra note 18 at 230-39; William Dickens & Jonathan Leonard,
"Accounting for the Decline in Union Membership, 1950-1980" (1985) 38 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev.
323; Thomas A. Kochan, Robert B. McKersie & John Chalykoff, "The Effects of Corporate
Strategy and Workplace Innovations on Union Representation (1986) 39 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev.
487; and Weiler, supra note 18.
' Terry Thomason & Silvana Pozzebon, "Managerial Opposition to Union Certification in
Quebec and Ontario" (1998) 53 Indus. Rel. L.J. 750; Karen Bentham, "Employer Resistance to
Union Certification: A Study of Canadian Jurisdictions"(2002) 57 Indus. Rel. L.J. 159.
24 Paul Smith & Gary Morton, "Union Exclusion and the Decollectivizing of Industrial
Relations" (1993) 31 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 97.
'5 The European Employment Strategy has also concentrated on developing more flexible
work labour market policies; see EC, Employment and social Affairs, European Employment
Strategy, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/employmentsocial/employment-strategy/indexen.htm>.
2007]
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citizens in the workplace. It seeks instead to characterize them as
"stakeholders," a generic concept that enables them to be analogized to
shareholders. Workers, it is'proposed, agree to an implicit contract
under which they accept less than an opportunity wage in the early and
middle part of their careers, when they first develop and then deploy
skills and knowledge specific to the enterprise, in exchange for receiving
a higher than opportunity wage in later years when their productivity is
declining. Their initial sacrifice, it is argued, amounts to a sunk
investment since they will not be able to sell their enterprise-specific
skills in the external labour market. Moreover, workers-
"stakeholders"-lack effective legal means to protect their investment, a
vulnerability also suffered by individual shareholders, though in a less
extreme form. It is on this basis that workers and other stakeholders
claim to be entitled-like shareholders-to consideration of their
interests in corporate decision making. Their claims are especially
cogent when stakeholder interests are adversely affected as a result of
significant corporate restructuring.26
Within this overall characterization, the literature moves in
several different directions. One tendency-embodied in legislation in
many American states-seeks to liberate corporate directors from the
duty to treat the "interests of the corporation" as precisely congruent
with the interests of its shareholders. 27 Directors are permitted, but not
compelled, to consider the interests of stakeholders as well as those of
the corporation. In the event of corporate restructuring, or a merger or
takeover, directors are allowed to negotiate arrangements which protect
workers' rights and interests-even if the result is to somewhat reduce
the financial gains of the shareholders. Proponents of this model of
employment relations suggest that the permissive provisions of first-
generation stakeholder statutes should be replaced by language that
requires directors to consider the interest of all relevant groups.28
A second tendency-related to the first-is to extrapolate from
the fiduciary duty owed by directors to shareholders to impose on
26 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, "Policing Employment Contracts within the Nexus-of-
Contracts Firm" (1993) 45 U.T.L.J. 353.
27 See "Symposium: Corporate Malaise-Stakeholder Statutes? Cause or Cure: Appendix"
(1991) 21 Stetson L. Rev. 279.
28 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, "Employees as Stakeholders Under Non-Shareholder
Constituency Statutes" (1991) 21 Stetson L. Rev. 45; Margaret M. Blair, "For Whom Should
Corporations be Run? An Economic Rationale for Stakeholder Management" (1998) 31 Long
Range Planning 195.
[VOL. 45, NO. 3
From Governance to Political Economy
corporate directors a comparable obligation to have regard for the
interests of other stakeholders, including workers. This position has
considerable moral cogency, not least because the power and wealth of
corporate management have become so disproportionate to that of the
workers employed by the corporation. However, the concept of a
fiduciary duty has yet to win clear legal acceptance, and faces significant
hostility from many corporate theorists and directors.29 True, some
legislation makes directors personally liable for workers' unpaid wages,3"
and for illness, injury,3' or harassment3" suffered in the workplace as a
result of the corporation's failure to take reasonable measures to protect
the workers, or of the directors' and management's failure to undertake
due diligence to safeguard their workers from risk. Such provisions hint
at the possible existence of a general legal obligation to workers based
on their subordination to the governance structures of the corporation.
However, that obligation has so far been derived from specific legislative
provisions and, despite the impressive efforts of scholars to ground it in
common law doctrines, has not yet been widely acknowledged or clearly
articulated as a general legal duty.33 Further, even if both these legal
innovations were to receive clear legislative or jurisprudential approval,
such an approach to the employment relationship has so far focused
solely on the manner of its termination, rather than on other aspects of
ongoing labour-management interaction.
A third approach acknowledges workers as stakeholders by
introducing their representatives directly into the governance structures
of the corporation. In the United Kingdom, for example, New Labour
made "partnership" the centerpiece of its workplace policy.3 4 British
unions generally responded positively, viewing partnership as a method
of regaining relevance after the Thatcher years of labour market
29 Marleen A. O'Connor, "Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a
Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers" (1991) 69 N.C.L. Rev. 1189; Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, "Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective" (1993) 43 U.T.L.J. 401.
3
oEmployment Standards Act, R.S.O. 2000, c-41, s. 79, 81.
' Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 217(1) as amended by R.S.C. 2003, c. 21, s. 3..
3 2 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d), (e).
-" Janis Sarra, "Corporate Governance Reform: Recognition of Workers' Equitable
Investments in the Firm" (1999) 32 Can. Bus. L.J. 384; Joseph William Singer, "The Reliance
Interest in Property Rights" (1988) 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611.
'
4 See UK, Department of Trade and Industry, "Fairness at Work," White Paper (London:
HMSO, 1998) quoted in Nicholas Bacon & John Storey, "New Employee Relations Strategies in
Britain: Towards Individualism or Partnership?" 38 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 407 at 407; Tony Dundon et.
al., "The Meanings and Purpose of Employee Voice" (2004) 15 Int'l J. Hum. Resources Mgmt. 1149.
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deregulation and waning membership. 35 However, it remains to be seen
whether the initial positive response will be sustained.36
At a regional level, European experiments with worker
participation in corporate management have reached their high-water
mark in two institutions. The first is the Works Council, which may be
established at the national level or, in the case of transnational
companies, at the European Union regional level. These representative
bodies are entitled to be informed about and/or consulted on important
decisions such as plant closings and redundancies, as well as on more
routine shop floor issues.37 The second institution is co-determination,
which under German law requires that worker-elected members
comprise half of each company's Supervisory Board responsible for
appointing and overseeing the management board. Unfortunately,
although widely heralded as introducing a robust and non-symbolic form
of social partnership into corporate management, German co-
determination has not proved adaptable to non-manufacturing
industries, and it is now diagnosed as one of the leading causes of
Germany's current economic woes.38
In North America, the stakeholder/partnership model has been
embraced, at least rhetorically, by many corporate leaders and has
spawned a vast body of scholarship.39 Partnership, it is claimed, will be the
3 Nicholas Bacon & Paul Blyton, "Co-operation and Conflict in Industrial Relations: What
are the Implications for Employees and Trade Unions?" (1999) 10 Int'l J. Hum. Resources Mgmt.
638 at 638-39; Peter Ackers & Jonathan Payne, "British Trade Unions and Social Partnership:
Rhetoric, Reality and Strategy" (1998) 9 Int'l J. Hum. Resources Mgmt. 529.
36 See John Kelly, "Social Partnership Agreements in Britain: Labor Cooperation and
Compliance" (2004) 43 Indus. Rel. L.J. 267; Tonia Novitz, "A Revised Role for Trade Unions as
Designed by New Labour: The Representation Pyramid and 'Partnership' (2002) 29 J.L. & Soc'y 487.
3 7See Paul L. Davies, "Workers on the Board of the European Company?" (2003) 32 Indus.
LJ. 75; see also Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, Works Councils: Consultation, Representation and
Cooperation in Industrial Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
'See Anke Hassel, "The Erosion of the German System of Industrial Relations" (1999) 37
Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 483; John Grahl & Paul Teague, "The German Model in Danger" (2004) 35 Indus.
Rel. L. J. 557; and John T. Addison, Claus Schnabel & Joachim Wagner, "The Course of Research
into the Economic Consequences of German Works Councils" (2004) 42 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 255.
39 Blair, supra note 28; Archie B. Carroll & Ann K. Buchholtz, Business and Society. Ethics
and Stakeholder Management (Cincinnati: South-Western, 1996); Max B.E. Clarkson, The
Corporation and Its Stakeholders: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., "Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web" (1986) 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1; Simon Deakin et al., "Partnership, Ownership and
Control: The Impact of Corporate Governance on Employment Relations" (2002) 24 Employee
Rel. 335; Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, "The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation:
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications" (1995) 20 Academy Mgmt Rev. 65; Adrienne E. Eaton &
Paula B. Voos, "Unions and Contemporary Innovations in Work Organization, Compensation, and
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basis upon which American corporations will maintain their
competitiveness in an increasingly competitive world,4" and stakeholder-
friendly management will be a strategy for corporations to regain the
public trust.4 Yet, few North American corporations have actually moved
to include stakeholders in their corporate governance processes. Indeed,
even when workers have secured participation, there was little evidence
that they were willing or able to significantly influence company policies.42
The current North American "stakeholder" discourse seems to
be designed largely to convince workers that their interests are
fundamentally aligned with those of the corporation.43 At the rhetorical
level, workers are urged to enhance their "human capital" through the
opportunities for learning provided by their employer; they are told that
they have been "empowered" by participation in work teams and other
strategies of self-discipline and peer management, and that they enjoy a
privileged status within the enterprise as "associates" with whom
management can "communicate openly."44 In similar fashion, directors
and managers are urged to adhere to the principles of "corporate social
responsibility" (CSR) with its implied promise that employees-among
others-will benefit from more enlightened corporate policies and
Employee Participation" in Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos, eds., Unions and Economic
Competitiveness (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992); Thomas A. Kochan & Paul Osterman, The
Mutual Gains Enterprise: Forging a Winning Enterprise Among Labor, Management, and
Government (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1994); Macey & Miller, supra note 29;
Singer, supra note 33; A.A. Sommer, Jr., "Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd
Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later" (1991) 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 33; and Stone, supra note 28.
4 US, Department of Commerce and Labor, "Employee Participation and Labor-
Management Cooperation in American Workplaces: Commission on the Future of Work-
Management Relations," reprinted in (1995) 38:5 Challenge38 at 40.
4 John A. Byrne, "Restoring Trust in Corporate America: Business Must Lead the Way to
Real Reform" Business Week 3788 (24 June 2002) 30; Thomas Clarke, "Accounting for Enron:
Shareholder Value and Stakeholder Interests" (2005) 13 Corporate Governance: International
Perspective 598.
42 Miguel Martinez Lucio & Mark Stuart, "Assessing Partnership: Workplace Trade Union
Representatives' Attitudes and Experiences" (2002) 24 Employee Rel. 305 at 314-16.
' Dave Ulrich, "A New Mandate for Human Resources" (1998) 76:1 Harv. Bus. Rev. 124;
Cathy A. Enz & Judy A. Siguaw, "Best Practises in Human Resources" (2000) 41:1 Cornell Hotel &
Restaurant Admin. Q. 48; and Paul S. Nadler, "Empowerment: The Human Resources Goal for a
New Century" (1999) 55:7 The Secured Lender 68.
4 Wal-Mart, for example, describes its corporate culture as such: "As a Wal-Mart
Associate, you're part of a continuously growing, global family. The key to our culture's
effectiveness is our Open Door Policy. Every Associate is encouraged to bring any suggestions to
their supervisor. We also administer a company-wide Grass Roots Survey, which allows Associates
to confidentially raise difficult issues about their Managers, policies and the company in general."
See online: < http://www.walmartstores.com > under "career information."
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become more loyal and efficient members of the corporate "team. '" 45
Combining this elevated moral sensibility with the threat that
backsliding will be punished in the marketplace, some scholars predict
that labour standards will be "ratcheted" upwards, through a self-
sustaining tendency which reflects the naturally reflexive propensity of
corporate cultures and organizations to adhere to "best practices."46 The
intent, and the effect, of such rhetoric is obviously to encourage workers
to think of themselves as "stakeholders," with an interest in improving
the company's productivity and profitability, which will bring its own
rewards for them as for other stakeholders.
While honestly intended in many cases, and enthusiastically
received by many workers, this vision of worker-employer partnership
offers a promise of goodwill but no method of ensuring its delivery.
Moreover, in some cases the same rhetoric has been used to co-opt
organized workers so as to weaken their loyalty to their union, and to
discourage them from advancing their interests through alternative,
conflictual strategies.47 The current debate over the stakeholder model
thus represents an attempt to shift the administration of the
employment relationship away from state regulation of power towards
self-regulation and/or market regulation. Well or ill intentioned, it is a
strategy effected by persuading workers that their interests are either
aligned with those of management or are best served by acquiescing in
management's priorities. The consequence-intended or otherwise-is
an erosion of workers' willingness and ability to rely on other courses of
action should this community of interest prove illusory.
C. Employees as "Human Capital"
If the notion of employees as "citizens at work" seems
anachronistic, and that of employees as corporate "stakeholders" perhaps
4 See Thomas 0. Davenport, Human Capital- What It Is and Why People Invest It (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999); Karen Lawson, "Build Your Business from the Inside out: Four Keys
to Employee Empowerment That Will Help Your Business Grow" (2001) 103:3 Business Credit 8;
and Susan G. Cohen & Diane E. Bailey, "What Makes Teams Work: Group Effectiveness from the
Shop Floor to the Executive Suite" (1997) 23 J. Mgmt 239.
' Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourk & Archon Fung, "Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation
for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace," (23 February 2000), online: Columbia Law
School <http:/Avww2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/ratchPO.html>; Cynthia L. Estlund, "Rebuilding
the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation" (2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 319 at 366-74.
4 7 John Kelly, "Union Militancy and Social Partnership" in Peter Ackers, Charles Smith &
Paul Smith, eds., The New Workplace and Trade Unionism (New York: Routledge, 1996) at 89-92.
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delusory or deceptive, is it more helpful to characterize their relationship
to their corporate employer as one involving "human capital"?48
Such an approach would require radical revision of labour
law's traditional preoccupation with the redistribution of power and
wealth within the employment relationship. That preoccupation
included measures to prevent extreme forms of exploitation by
corporate employers, to regulate the use of workers' countervailing
power, and to provide a platform for contract-based benefits and for
state welfare policies.49 But all of these strategies worked largely
because, during the post-war era, employment relationships had
become relatively secure and enduring. Lengthy job tenure enabled
workers to develop solidarity, justified their short-term sacrifices
during strikes, and gave them reason to agree to complex collective
agreements or corporate HR strategies. Without lengthy tenures,
pensions and health insurance plans based on the accumulation of
employer, employee, and state contributions would have been
impossible, and new social institutions such as annual vacations and
compassionate leave would be illogical. At the same time, tenure
helped make these innovations affordable, because workers who
became more skilled and more committed to the enterprise over time
also became more productive and less militant. °
This logic seems to have dissolved as the post-war Fordist
regime gave way to a new liberalized and globalized economy in which
the underlying relations of employment have become increasingly
ephemeral, institutions of countervailing power have atrophied, state
programs of income maintenance have become less generous, and the
Fordist social contract has fallen into disrepute." The 1999 Supiot
' The W. Irwin Gillespie Roundtables, Minister of Labour's Roundtable on Modernizing
Labour Policy within a Human Capital Strategy for Canada, 2002, 28 Canadian Public Policy at 71ff.
' Brian A. Langille, "Labour Policy in Canada: New Platform, New Paradigm" (2002) 28
Canadian Public Policy 133 at 137-139.
5 0Harry W. Arthurs, "Labour Law without the State?" (1996) 46 U.T.L.J. 1.
t Deborah A. DeMott, "Fluid Relationships in Transitional Times: A Comment on
Employees and Corporate Governance" (2000) 22 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 149. DeMott estimates
that workers born between 1957 and 1964 will have held an average of 9.2 jobs between age 18 and
age 34. See also a survey by John J. Heldrich Center for Workforce Development, Rutgers
University and Center for Survey Research and Analysis, University of Connecticut; K.A. Dixon &
Carl E. Van Horn, "The Disposable Worker: Living in a Job-Loss Economy" (2003) 6:2 Work
Trends, online: <http:/Avww.heldrich.rutgers.edu/uploadedFiles/Pubicatidons/Dispsabe%2OWorker.pdf>.
For a review of potential effects, see Stone, supra note 15, c. 4; Simon Deakin, "The Evolution of
the Employment Relationship" in Peter Auer & Bernard Gazier, eds., The Future of Work,
Employment and Social Protection: The Dynamics of Change and the Protection of Workers
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Report to the European Commission suggests that these fundamental
dislocations of labour market policy and labour law were attributable to
three developments: 1) rising skill levels among workers, 2) growing
competition through increasingly open markets, and 3) rapid
technological advances.5 2  In response to these changes, corporate
employers adopted flexible employment arrangements by redeploying
personnel, operations, investments, and risks from the corporation's
"core" to alternative sites along the extended production and
distribution chains, at many of which the corporation itself is not
present.. The result was not only attenuated links between the
corporation and its employees,53 but also the dissolving of worker
solidarity and the disabling of the social innovations, legal mechanisms,
and public policies which had been premised on the long-term
employment contract.54 Consequently, as Langille argues, the contract
of employment no longer seems the logical site for regulatory
intervention to guide our labour policies."
The Supiot Report represents perhaps the most thorough and
imaginative response to this challenge. It suggests that the employment
relationship, narrowly defined, should no longer delimit the legal and
social parameters of labour law. Rather, labour law should be
organized around a more general concept of work or career, or what
Langille defines as the "working life cycle." This shift-Supiot,
Langille, and others agree-is needed both to create a labour market
appropriate for a dynamic, flexible knowledge-based economy56 and to
(International Labour Organization, 2002), online: <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/
download/lyonang.pdf>. Also, see generally William E. Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the
SocialAcceleration of Time (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004) at 6-15.
2 Alain Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes in Work and the Future of Labour Law in
Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 2 [Supiot Report].
3 Ibid. at 1-23.
' Linda Dickens, "Problems of Fit: Changing Employment and Labour Regulation" (2004)
42 Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 595.
5 5Langille, supra note 49 at 140.
56 "'Flexicurity'-a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a deliberate way, to
enhance the flexibility of labour markets, the work organisation and labour relations on the one
hand, and to enhance security-employment security and social security-notably for weaker
groups in and outside the labour market on the other hand" has attracted growing interest in
Europe. See Ton Wilthagen & Ralf Rogowski, "Legal Regulation of Transitional Labour Markets"
in Gunther Schmid & Bernard Gazier, eds., The Dynamics of Full Employment: Social Integration
Through Transitional Labour Markets (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002) 233 at 250; Thomas
Bredgaard, Flemming Larsen & Per Kongshoj Madsen, "The Flexible Danish Labour Market-a
review" (Aalborg, Denmark: Centre for Labour Market Research, 2005), online:
<http://www:tilburguniversity.ni/faculties/frw/research/schoordijk/flexicurity/publications/papers/fxp
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ensure that labour law can resume its historic protective functions in
the context of such a market.57
As compensation for the loss of Fordist labour law's old familiar
protections, the new regime would establish a system of social
citizenship premised on labour market participation, and emphasizing
the economic value of human capital.5" Individuals, as socially-
productive citizens, would have access to a series of "social drawing
rights" which could be used to aid in their skills development or to
spread the risks of a highly volatile labour market more evenly over time
and across the polity. Drawing rights would include those which accrue
from employment itself (wages, etc.); those generically associated with
labour market participation (health and safety); those emerging from
non-remunerated types of work (volunteer, self-training, and
homework); and finally, the universal social rights not emerging from
work but from one's social citizenship (health care and social security).59
Thus the employment relationship would no longer provide the sole or
dominant platform for labour market policy, but would serve instead as
one among several.' This, presumably, would permit greater flexibility
in employment relations and encourage the emergence of appropriate
policies in other settings.
This new vision of labour law and employment relations has
much to recommend it, including a credible diagnosis of the current
realities of the labour market. However, it is also fraught with
contradictions, which may ultimately prove to be its undoing.
Clearly, it is in the interests of workers, employers, and society
as a whole that workers be well trained and highly motivated, that their
material needs and dignity be attended to, and that this be
accomplished without placing undue reliance on the employment
relationship. However, the protections and incentives provided in the
new dispensation will not fall from the sky. But, who will provide
them? If it is employers, they must be persuaded to engage in an act of
social benevolence: training workers, who by definition are destined to
leave them in the near future, which would cause them to lose their
2005-12-larsenmadsenbredgaard.pdf>; and Gosta Esping-Andersen & Marino Regini, Why
Deregulate Labour Markets?(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
5 7Langille, supra note 49 at 190-91.
' Gunther Schmid, "Transitional Labour Markets and the European Social Model:
Towards a New Employment Compact," in Schmid & Gazier, eds., supra note 56 at 393.
5 S9 upiot Report, supra note 52 at 52-57.
o Langille, supra note 49 at 141.
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sunk investment in training, and conceivably also the employee "know
how" and other insider information. If it is employees themselves, they
must be convinced to take risks by investing in human capital-
themselves-at the very moment when threats to their rights, earnings,
benefits, and job tenure have made them risk-averse.61 If it is the state,
it must recover its capacity to raise taxes, invest in social infrastructure,
and exercise at least a modicum of dirigisme in labour markets.62 This
requires a change in our political culture that is not yet in evidence.
Thus, this exciting new vision is likely to remain only an elegant
intellectual exercise until a wide variety of public and private actors
abandon their traditional values, interests, perceptions, and behaviours.
D. Employees as "Investors"
Perhaps half or more of American workers are investors, either
directly in their own right or indirectly through pension funds, benefit
funds, credit unions, labour-sponsored venture capital funds, mutual
funds, or other institutional investment pools.63 However, for several
reasons neither individual employee-shareholders nor worker-controlled
investment funds have shown much inclination to intervene in corporate
decision making.
First, a considerable percentage of pension funds are not in
fact controlled by workers or unions, but by employers or employers'
nominees. Second, while Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
have increased in number since they were first introduced in the mid-
1960s,6 they are still not common. Third, the vast majority of workers
still do not invest directly in the company which employs them, nor do
union-managed funds often take strategic positions in such companies.
6' Supiot Report, supra note 52 at 26-28; David Marsden & Hugh Stephenson, eds., Labour
Law and Social Insurance in the New Economy: A Debate on the Supiot Report (London: Centre
for Economic Performance, 2001) at 3, online: <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/DPO500.pdf>.
6 2Stone, supra note 15, c. 5, 9; Supiot Report, ibid. at 24-26.
'aOne study estimated that 43% of all American households owned stocks or mutual funds-
and that the number was rising on a steep trajectory: Richard Nadler "The Rise of Worker Capitalism"
(1999) 359 Policy Analysis 1. It is unclear whether this number includes workers' interests in union-
managed pension fund and benefit plan assets, estimated in 2003 to have a value of over $5 trillion.
Testimony of Daman A. Silvers, Associate General Counsel AFL-CIO to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation (20 May 2003), online: American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations <http:/www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/prsptm/tniO5202003.cfm >.
' Centre for Economic and Social Justice, "Employee Stock Ownership Plans," online:
<http://www.cesj.org/homestead/creditvehicles/cha-esop.htm>. ESOPs provide tax credits for
workers who invest in the firm which employs them.
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As a result, while unions and union-owned investment funds do
sometimes seek to advance workers' interests through shareholder
resolutions, 65 non-union institutional investors, which hold the bulk of
the workers' investment funds, seem to feel little compulsion to do
likewise. Indeed, workers themselves mainly want institutional
investors to produce reliably high rates of return, an outcome which
might be put at risk if they pursued a secondary agenda of
championing social causes.
As a result, corporate management rarely feels pressured to
respond to the wishes of employee-investors. There are of course
exceptions. Start-up companies may compensate their employees with
shares or stock options, in lieu of market-level salaries; insolvent
corporations may persuade employees and unions to exchange past or
future wages for equity holdings, in order to keep the company afloat.
But these are relatively rare occurrences and, in general, workers have
not succeeded in aggregating their collective power as investors to
advance their interests within the corporation that employs them.
Still, the reincarnation of employees as investors does appear to
be having one potentially important consequence: the transformation of
workers' identity and consciousness, and their incorporation into what
has been described as a political system of "market populism '66 or
"worker capitalism. 67 Critics and proponents seem to agree that stock
ownership makes workers more inclined to favour reduced tax burdens
on wealth holders, and less inclined to favour costly government
programs for the delivery of health, education, or other public services
which could be purchased privately.
In conclusion, the four dominant post-war strategies for
ensuring recognition of workers interests within the corporation all
appear to have failed, both conceptually and practically. In each case the
problem appears to be, at least in part, a failure to comprehend the
corporation as a political economy in itself, as well as an indispensable
actor in the wider political economy.
63 Marleen O'Connor, "Labor's Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure"
(2000) 22 Comp. Lab L. & Pol'y J. 97; Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, "Realigning
Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions" (1998) 96 Mich. L. Rev 1018 at 1022.
' Thomas Frank, One Market Under God: Extreme Capitasm, Market Populism, and the
End of Economic Democracy(New York: Doubleday, 2000).
67 Nadler, supra note 43.
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III. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE FIRM:
COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY/DIVERGENCE AND
CONFLICT
Most theories of the corporation explicitly state or implicitly
assume that its actions are ultimately motivated by the desire to enhance
its profitability: that they represent a considered response to market and
other conditions which may affect profitability positively or negatively-
arrived at by human agents who act in accordance with mandates
defined by its formal governance procedures. As Milton Friedman
notoriously argued:
[A] corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in
accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible
while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those
embodied in ethical custom .... '
Of course since corporate actions are the result of human
judgments, they are by no means automatic or inevitable. But they are
usually thought to emanate from a unitary corporate intelligence which
is hierarchically controlled or, at the very least, coordinated through an
established framework for consultation. To this general understanding
there is one well-understood exception: decisions regarding labour.
Conventional industrial relations (IR) literature postulates a bilateral
relationship between the collectivity of workers (ie., union, employee
association, unorganized workers) and the collectivity, of management
(ie., shareholders, directors and managers). This bilateral relationship is
generally understood to be one of conflictual cooperation.
However, contrary to general understandings concerning unitary
corporate decision making and bilateral conflictual worker-management
relations, we argue that conflictual cooperation subsists not only
between collectivities of labour and management, but also within them.
A. Management
It has long been understood--corporate governance theories to
the contrary notwithstanding-that in practice directors are not mere
agents of the shareholders, nor are managers mere servants of the
'Milton Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits" New
York Times Magazine (13 September 1970) 243.
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directors.69 What is less often understood is that managers themselves
may operate according to the inconsistent logics or competing interests
associated with their functional mandate (ie., finance, marketing, sales,
production, HR, technostructure) or their site of operations (head office
or subsidiary, North America, Europe, or "third world"). When choices
have to be made, managers nominally respond to what appears to be "the
best interests of the firm." But the firm's interests have an odd way of
coinciding with their own, or at least of reflecting their individual way of
looking at the world. This is implicitly acknowledged by the literature of
corporate decision making which stresses the need for coordination and
the powerful influence of expertise. Finally, while coordination represents
a challenge to corporations of all sizes and at all times, that challenge may
be heightened both by internal developments such as growth in its size,
complexity, or modes of production and by exogenous factors such as
globalization, regulatory environment, or market conditions.7"
Strategies for coordination range from the assertion of top-down
hierarchical control to hetrarchical or team-building strategies, as well as
from development of strong corporate cultures or values to information-
sharing and better training. But each of. these ultimately represents an
attempt to ensure that the individual human agents who comprise
"management" respond to common or collective imperatives, and not to
those which merely advance their own personal interests. This is an
obvious source of the pathology which leads corporate managers to
subordinate their own familial, psychological, and sometimes financial
well-being when the corporation "needs" them to do so.
Of course, the corporation achieves coordination by offering
rewards (financial incentives and symbolic recognition, promises of
promotion, immunity from redundancy) as well as by threatening
sanctions (withholding of rewards, demotion, dismissal).71 Rewards and
sanctions are less effective when they are actually invoked than when
they operate prospectively to shape values, influence perceptions, and
condition behaviour. However, this is not always positive, even from the
perspective of the corporation. Sometimes rewards and sanctions create
extreme and harmful pathologies. Senior corporate actors forecast or
6" See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305.
'°See e.g. John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Miflin,
1968) especially c. XIV.
7' John Parkinson, "Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship" (2003) 41
Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 481.
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report false financial success. Managers point the finger to deflect blame
for their failures onto others. Lower level operatives adhere to
dysfunctional but duly authorized procedures rather than risk censure by
taking independent-initiatives."
Somehow, these internal contentions among managers are
ultimately made to disappear. They are resolved by reasoned argument,
by compromise, or by coercion; they are obfuscated by polite, placatory
behaviour in conference rooms or executive offices; they are left to
fester while events flow around them. But the fact remains that
coordination within management is seldom perfect, and decisions are
often taken on the basis of the personal preference, perception, or profit
of individual managers, not because they are "in best interests of the
corporation."
A practical example will illustrate the point. Suppose branch-
plant management is faced with a directive from head office to reduce
unit costs of production. A decision will have to be taken whether to
ratchet down the price of locally purchased goods and services, to seek
wage concessions from employees, to expand sales in order to achieve
gains in marginal efficiency, or to ask for an expanded product mandate
which will permit more intensive use of the existing plant" and
machinery. Different members of the management team may have very
different views on which is the best strategy, and those views may be far
from objective. Those concerned with procurement or contract
administration may feel that to deliver the needed cost reductions will
endanger their carefully cultivated relations with reliable long-term
suppliers or the local community. Human resources/international
relations managers may be opposed to wage reductions which they know
will provoke a strike or make it difficult to hire good workers in the local
labour market-thus creating serious trouble for themselves in the
future. Sales managers may be pessimistic about the possibilities of
expanding markets and fear that they may be forced to promise what
they cannot deliver. And the local CEO may not wish to argue for an
expanded mandate because this may engender conflict with peers or
superiors, which will diminish his or her chances of climbing the
corporate ladder. Or conversely, any of these managers may aggressively
assert the opposite position, making the calculation that if they can
72 Margaret M. Blair, "Post-Enron Reflections on Comparative Corporate Governance"
(2003) 14 J. Interdisc. Econ. 113; Robert W. Armstrong, Robert J. Williams & J. Douglas Barrett,
"The Impact of Banality, Risky Shift and Escalating Commitment on Ethical Decision Making"
(2004) 53 J. Bus. Ethics 365.
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achieve the objective set by head office-regardless of the consequences
for colleagues, workers, suppliers, or the community-they will advance
their own careers.
The point is that whatever strategy is adopted, it will not result
solely from a considered consensus about how to advance the "best
interests of the corporation." The decision will reflect a significant
degree of jockeying for personal positional advantage, a central feature
of the political economy of the corporation.
B. Workers and Unions
Similar behaviour can be identified among rank-and-file workers.
Unions are often "managers of discontent": they routinely persuade or
coerce individuals and small groups of workers into abandoning protests
or grievances which might threaten the overall interests of the
collectivity.73 The result may well be, for example, that the introduction of
new machinery or work practices acceptable to or acquiesced in by most
workers may prejudicially affect the working lives of a small group, whose
protests have been suppressed by their own union.
Unions are also often described as functioning as "brokers"
among various constituencies of workers. They must find a way to
reconcile the legitimate expectations of skilled technicians in high
demand in the external labour market with those of the wood-hewers and
water-drawers who have fewer prospects outside the firm but who
dominate the internal labour market and the union membership roster.
They must persuade older workers trying to accumulate larger pensions
to accept that the company will have to be able to devote significant funds
to improving the wages of younger workers. They must balance the claims
of workers whose legitimate expectation of promotion is based on a
traditional seniority system with the claims of those most likely to benefit
from affirmative action programs designed to overcome the embedded
effects of old discriminatory hiring practices. And most poignantly, they
must sometimes choose between sacrificing some members' jobs and
keeping a plant open and all jobs if operations shut down.74
In the North American context, the competing interests and
preferences of these individual employees and groups have somehow
' C. Wright Mills, The New Men of Power: American's Labor Leaders (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1948); D.H. Watson, Managers of Discontent: Trade Union Officers and
Industrial Relations Managers (London: Routledge, 1988).
74
'Watson, ibid. at 171-73.
2007]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
been mediated so that union negotiators can present a coherent package
to management, and so that if and when a collective agreement is signed
and submitted to a ratification vote, it will receive not only nominal
majority support but a broad base of genuine acceptance.7' European
unions generally function at a greater distance from the individual
workplace, but they too must somehow maintain industrial, social, and
political solidarity among workers with often widely divergent interests.
Even-perhaps especially-in the absence of unions, employees
develop ways of dealing with each other's competing demands and
interests. Dunlop's famous insight that all workplaces are characterized
by a "web of rule" reminds us that in any complex relationship, such as a
workplace, neither managers nor workers pursue their own interests
without regard to the effect of their conduct on others, whether laterally
across the same level of the organization (worker to worker, manager to
manager) or vertically through the formal hierarchy (executive to
manager to worker).76 For example, workers may punish deviant
conduct such as "rate busting," which produces pressures to speed up
work by informal grassroots sanctions such as ostracization or even
sabotage.77 Employer-sponsored work teams or quality circles may be
used not only to disseminate know-how and improve productivity but to
construct a system of worker self-discipline which enables conflicts to be
resolved without direct managerial oversight or intervention." Informal
employee caucuses may emerge to advance the interests of specific
constituencies-women, minorities, occupational groups-not only vis-
a-vis the employer, but in opposition to the interests of other groups.7 9
And of course the existence of Works Councils in Europe and non-
union employee associations in North America testifies to the need not
only for a collective worker voice to convey employee views to
7s In North America, the principles of exclusivity and majoritarianism allow unions to
negotiate this difficult terrain. A union with the support of a majority of the workers in a
"bargaining unit" may seek "certification" as the bargaining agent; if granted, the union thereafter
enjoys exclusive representation rights, tempered by the duty to "fairly represent" all employees in
the unit. See Roy J. Adams, Industrial Relations under Liberal Democracy- North America in a
Comparative Perspective (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995) c. 4.
'
6Dunlop, supra note 2.
' Michale Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under Monopoly
Capitalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Edwards & Scullion, supra note 3.
' S. Henry, "Factory Law: The Changing Disciplinary Technology of Industrial Social
Control" (1982) 10 Int'l J. Soc. L. 365.
' Alan Stuart Hyde, "Employee Caucuses: A Key Institution in the Emergent System of
Employment Law" (1993) 69 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 149 at 172-73.
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management-itself the site of rival interests and perspectives-but also
for a forum in which workers can reconcile their competing interests.80
C. The Corporation and "Others"
It hardly needs saying that the "best interests of the corporation"
often conflict with the "best interests" of competitors, even though all
.participants in a given market may have common interests in
government policies which regulate them, consumer attitudes which
define their market prospects, or interest rates and raw materials prices
which determine their profit margins. What is somewhat less obvious is
that "the best interests of the corporation" often diverge from the best
interests of its own workers, valued suppliers and customers, the
community and ecosystems in which it functions, and also from the best
interests of its nominal owners, the shareholders.
At first blush, this emphasis on conflict might seem to directly
challenge the notion that a wide range of stakeholders contribute to and
benefit from the success of any business enterprise, and that their views
and interests ought therefore to be taken into account in corporate
decision making. It certainly brings into question the conventional
assumption that shareholders are not only the ultimate beneficiaries of
corporate success, but also the ultimate arbiters of all corporate
conduct. Still, in the present context, attention to the conflictual
dimension of all corporate decision making ought to be uncontroversial.
After all, as the old adage goes, "to govern is to choose." This, we will
argue, is an essential step in comprehending the political economy of
the corporation.
D. The Political Economy of the Corporation
To reiterate a point we have now made several times, the
corporation is not what it seems: a site of orderly activity in which
rational economic actors identify with and act in response to "the best
interests of the corporation"-interests that are themselves
hierarchically determined, clear, predictable, internally consistent, and
normatively beyond challenge. On the contrary, the corporation is
inevitably the site of contestation and incessant, inescapable,
consequential choice by myriad actors with- divergent mandates,
Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Gottlieb Taras, eds., Nonunion Employee Representation:
History, Contemporary Practice, and Policy (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).
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interests, and frames of reference. It is therefore, inevitably, a site of
conflict. A description of its political economy thus involves the
identification of who makes which choices, on what basis, with what
degree of regard for others, under what conditions of formal or practical
constraint, and in which institutional context.
Without attempting definitive answers to these questions, we
can at least propose that the political economy of the corporation
indeed involves the exercise of power-both legal and economic-but
that power is relatively widely disseminated both within and beyond the
formal governance structures of the corporation.
However, the wide dissemination of that power does not imply
an equal distribution of this power. As recent experience has
demonstrated, senior executives have the capacity to take important-
even fateful-decisions relatively free from scrutiny by the board of
directors, with much less accountability to shareholders, workers, and
other stakeholders.8 They also have the capacity to appropriate
rewards much larger than those enjoyed by lower levels of
management, and orders of magnitude greater than those assigned to
workers 2 that are unrelated to performance and sometimes paid to the
clear prejudice of shareholders.83
On the other hand, other actors-middle management, front
rank supervisors, rank-and-file employees-have the capacity to take
much smaller decisions which may nonetheless be fateful in their
aggregation, if not individually. They too have the ability to claim
rewards-to appropriate a share of corporate earnings-which may take
the form of low visibility perks, favourable workplace conditions, or
simply the space to act (or not act) opportunistically and according to
their personal preferences. Nor are stakeholders-workers, suppliers
and customers, the state, the community, and the environment-totally
without influence. Even the most conventional accounts of corporate
governance acknowledge that decision making must be geared towards
avoiding adverse investor behaviour, consumer reactions, or regulatory
st Blair, supra note 72 at 113; Clarke, supra note 41; and Simon Deakin & Suzanne J.
Konzelmann, "After Enron: an age of enlightenment?" (2003) 10 Organization 583.
I Lucien Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Executive Compensation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Louise Lavelle, "A Payday
For Performance" Business Week 3929 (18 April 2005) 78; Ellen M. Heffes, "Compensation:
Investors Troubled by Corporate Policies" (1 September 2005) Financial Executive 11; and Byrne,
supra note 41 at 37-44.
'
3Ray Murrill, "Stock Options Still the Preferred Incentive" Canadian HR Reporter 18:12
(20 June 2005) 12.
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consequences.84 Shareholders and stakeholders-including workers-
can significantly heighten the risk of such adverse consequences, if they
are aggrieved, aggressive, well informed, and coordinated (which is to
say if they can overcome their own governance problems), and if they
insist that their voice be heard, despite not having a formal role in
decision making.
Our argument comes to this: corporate decision making is not
just the product of "governance," of the formal institutions and
processes assigned responsibility by law, or of custom. Rather, it is the
outcome of a highly conflictual political economy, and of negotiations
among myriad individual and collective actors whose influences operate
within and around and, often, in opposition to or in disregard of the
formal mechanisms of governance. Finally, the political economy of the
corporation is embedded in-but also formative of-larger national and
global political economies. This fact generates additional tensions.
On the one hand, "globalization of the mind"-the worldwide
dissemination of conventional wisdom among knowledge-based elites-
has produced some convergence in the political perspectives,
management structures, decision-making processes, and business
strategies of major corporations. To some extent this convergence has
the effect of persuading influential public policy makers and corporate
actors that certain forms of labour market regulation, modes of
production, corporate structures, and managerial "best practices" are
uniquely compatible with high productivity, national competitiveness,
and, ultimately, corporate success.
On the other hand, notwithstanding globalization, differences
persist. American, Japanese, French, and Swedish corporations display
somewhat different attitudes towards the state, different formal
governance systems, and different internal political economies from,
say, corporations in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, or Korea
(not to mention South Africa, India, and Brazil). Varieties of
I Richard M. Altman, Investor Response to Management Decisions: A Research-Based
Analysis of Actions and Effects (Westport, CT.: Quorum Books, 1992); E. Frank Harrison, The
ManagerialDecision-Making Process, 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999).
' Harry W. Arthurs, "Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of
Legal Fields" (1997) 12 C.J.L.S. 219; Sanford Jacoby, Emily Nason & Kazuro Saguchi, "Corporate
Organization in Japan and the United States: Is There Evidence of Convergence?" (15 June 2004),
online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=559124>; Christel Lane,
"Changes in Corporate Governance of German Corporations: Convergence to the Anglo-American
Model?" (March 2003) ESCR Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working
Paper No. 259, online: <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP259.pdf>.
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capitalism, in other words, produce varieties of corporate strategies for
dealing with workers, customers, suppliers, shareholders, regulators,
and policy makers.8 6 Even major transnational corporations, closely
identified with the political and business culture of the country where
they originate and have their principal operations or head offices, are
under considerable pressure to adjust to local labour market
conditions and ways of ordering workplace relations.87 Indeed, there is
little evidence that they attempt to export their home country HR/IR
policies holus-bolus to other jurisdictions where they conduct
operations, except perhaps where the host country bears a close
affinity to the home country, as with Canada and the United States. 88
Workplace regulation is often regarded as culture-, country-, and
corporation-specific, and warnings abound concerning the non-
exportability of labour laws and industrial relations systems and
practices-along with powerful appeals to the horizon-expanding
potential of the comparative approach.89
In short, globalization has revealed another dimension of the
political economy of the corporation. The writ of its global board and
management does not run everywhere, it cannot always be invoked to
require elements of the corporation to conform to centrally determined
policies, and it cannot always ignore or expect to transform local and
specialized social systems.
'Robert Boyer & Pierre-Frangois Souyri, Mondialisation et rdgulations : Europe et Japon
face i la singularit6 amdricaine (Paris: D6couverte, 2001); Robert Boyer, "State and Market: A
New Engagement for the Twenty-first Century" in Robert Boyer & Daniel Drache eds., States
Against Markets The Limits of Globalization (New York: Routledge, 1996) 84; Peter A. Hall &
David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
'
7Harry W. Arthurs, "Who's Afraid of Globalization? Reflections on the Future of Labour
Law" in John D.R. Craig & S. Michael Lynk, eds., Globalization and the Future of Labour Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Tony Edwards, "Corporate Governance,
Industrial Relations and Trends in Company-Level Restructuring in Europe: Convergence Towards
the Anglo-American Model" (2004) 35 Indus. Rel. J. 518.
8" Harry W. Arthurs, "The Role of Global Law Firms in Constructing or Obstructing a
Transnational Regime of Labour Law" in Richard P. Appelbaum, William L.F. Felstiner &
Volkmar Gessner, eds., Rules and Networks: The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions
(Portland: Hart, 2001) 273; but cf Susan Bisom-Rapp, "Exceeding Our Boundaries: Transnational
Employment Law Practice and the Export of American Lawyering Styles to the Global Worksite"
(2004) 25 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 257.
"9 The locus classicus is 0. Kahn-Freund, "On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law"
(1974) 37 Mod. L. Rev. 1. But see e.g. Christopher J. Whelan, "Labor Law and Comparative Law"
(1985) 63 Texas L. Rev. 1425; Manfred Weiss, "The Future of Comparative Labor Law as an
Academic Discipline and as a Practical Tool" (2003) 25 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 169; and see more
generally, William Twining, "Social Science and the Diffusion of Law" (2005) 32 J.L. & Soc. 203.
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These insights, largely derived from an examination of
corporate-worker relations, raise questions about current attempts to
reform corporate governance roles, structures, and processes. As is well
understood, these proposed reforms are fuelled by recent dramatic
episodes in which corporations have inflicted grievous harms, not only
on their workers (that is assumed), but on other constituencies-
shareholders and bondholders-whose interests have traditionally been
more carefully protected than workers' interests. Indeed, to the extent
that the buoyancy of capital markets is often used as a proxy for a
successful economy, a case can be made that all of us-including
workers-have a stake in the proposed reforms. After all, if investors
hesitate to invest and lenders to lend, businesses cannot expand and new
jobs cannot be created. Tax revenues will stagnate, the value of pension
funds and other collective investments will decline, and government
expenditures will have to be curtailed. Thus, it can be argued, we all
have a stake in the success of conventional corporate governance
reforms. However, for reasons we have sketched above, and consolidate
below in the form of a series of hypotheses, we believe that these
reforms are likely to miss the mark.
IV. RE-IMAGINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS
POLITICAL ECONOMY: SEVEN HYPOTHESES
We have so far focussed largely on the roles of workers and
managers in corporate decision making, in suggesting that these roles
are more accurately described in the discourse of political economy than
that of governance. In this final section, we extrapolate from the
experience of workers and managers in corporate governance to that of
other groups which stand at a greater distance. In this regard, our work
parallels that of Peer Zumbansen and others who have used labour law
as both a microscope and a telescope with which to examine the micro-
and macro-agenda of corporate reform.9"
We propose seven very tentative hypotheses, not as firm
conclusions but as provocations to further debate.
HYPOTHESIS 1
Just as public governance is increasingly understood to involve
processes beyond those formally or constitutionally designated as such,
I Zumbansen, supra note I.
2007]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
corporate governance must be understood to include the whole array of
processes and institutions which shape corporate policy and action.9'
HYPOTHESIS 2
The claims of workers that their voices must be heard within
corporate decision making is as much a descriptive claim as it is a
prescriptive claim. It does not stem from legal doctrines (the duty to
bargain collectively, fiduciary obligations, implied contract, etc.), from
moral or metaphorical claims (industrial citizenship), or from economic
logic (worker empowerment reduces militancy and enhances
productivity)-though all of these may have some validity. Rather it
stems from the ineluctable fact that the actions of all human actors
within the firm in some measure ultimately influence the course of
corporate action.
HYPOTHESIS 3
Public choice theory-like Marxism-sensibly assumes that
rational self-interested actors will make governance decisions in their
own interest. 2 If true, it is equally so for public and corporate
governance. If politicians and public servants cannot or do not act "in
the public interest," corporate directors, officers, and managers cannot
or do not act "in the interests of the corporation"; or rather they act in
that version of the corporation's interests which coincides with their own
interests.
HYPOTHESIS 4
How much and in what ways workers (and other actors) actually
influence corporate action is determined not by the formal rules and
structures of governance but by the extent and character of their
power-by the political economy of the firm. Power, however, is
determined by influences both indigenous and endogenous to the firm.
Influences may include labour markets and markets for the firm's goods
or services, corporate and general cultures, social and productive
9" Harry W. Arthurs, "What Immortal Hand or Eye?-Who Will Redraw the Boundaries of
Labour Law?" in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) 373.
2 J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent. The Logical Foundations of
Constitutional Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 1962); M. Olsen, The Logic of Collective
Action (NY: Schoken, 1965).
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technologies, state and non-state normative regimes, and the global and
national political economy within which the firm operates.
HYPOTHESIS 5
Corporate governance is inherently conflictual and unstable
because of the tendency of the groups of corporate actors denominated
as labour and management to assert their own interests. While the
reconciliation of competing claims does occur, it occurs at multiple
levels, according to conflicting policy logics, within non-congruent time
frames, and with varying degrees of explicitness.
HYPOTHESIS 6
Proposals that rely on self-regulation, CSR, or "best practices"
to improve corporate governance assume a commonality of interest
among corporate actors which is prima facie at odds with the conflictual
political economy which we have described.93 They should be viewed
with scepticism. Proposals to incorporate employees into the formal
governance of the corporation at the level of the workplace and the
boardroom-whether as citizens claiming democratic rights of
participation, stakeholders claiming distributional consideration, or
holders of human or financial capital claiming a return on their
investment-should also be assessed in light of the complex, conflictual,
and dynamic nature of the governance process.9 4
HYPOTHESIS 7
The "new" corporate governance must not focus exclusively or
primarily on decision making by boards of directors and managers.
Rather, corporate governance can best be reformed by defining and
structuring sites of conflict both inside and outside the corporation, and
by emphasizing the means of mediating and managing, and occasionally
promoting, conflict.
93 Harry W. Arthurs, "Corporate Self-Regulation: Political Economy, State Regulation and
Reflexive Labour Law" in Brian Bercusson & Cynthia Estlund eds., Regulating Labour in the
Wake of Globalisation (Oxford: Hart, 2007) [forthcoming].
9' Allan C. Hutchinson, The Companies We Keep: Corporate Governance For a
Democratic Society (Irwin Law: 2005).
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SUMMARY
As noted, these seven hypotheses invite further investigation,
challenge, and perhaps, revision. However, if they turn out to represent
a more-or-less accurate account of the dynamic of corporate decision
making, they will have to be taken into account across a broad spectrum
of current concerns. How can shareholders with modest holdings
effectively register their views on proposed corporate actions that they
perceive as contrary to their interests or values? How can directors,
charged with, the formal responsibility for corporate governance,
discharge their responsibilities when they are almost wholly dependent
on management for information and analysis? How can states influence
decisions regarding the sale of domestic corporations to foreign parties,
in order to avoid the loss of tax revenues, head office functions,
production jobs, community well-being, or local control over valuable
technologies and resources? How can corporations be held to account
for failing to maintain an appropriate "triple bottom line," which
balances financial, environmental, and social outcomes? How can small
businesses along the supply chains and distribution chains of dominant
corporations protect themselves from abusive contractual practices?
How can members of minority or marginalized groups be guaranteed
access to jobs and influence within the corporation commensurate with
their talents? And of course, how can workers in general be assured
decent and safe jobs, a measure of job security, and some voice in
workplace and corporate decisions that affect them?
As yet, neither market discipline nor state regulation has
produced satisfactory responses, and neither has traditional doctrines of
corporate law or corporate "best practices." New strategies based on a
better understanding of how corporations actually make decisions may
prove more successful.
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